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Commodifying “Islamic Law” in the
U.S. Legal Academy
Lena Salaymeh
At a recent symposium on Islamic law, I spoke with a young U.S. law
professor who told me about his experience at the Association of American
Law Schools’ hiring conference. Apparently, his law school adviser had
instructed him to sit in the lobby with a copy of the Qurʾān open in his lap.
The adviser was confident this would attract attention. Someone would ask
him about his interest in Islamic law, the conversation would lead to more
interviews with law schools, and…
Reacting to market demands, some legal scholars choose to add an Islamic
component to their CVs for the express purpose of attracting potential
employers (law schools) and enhancing their professional standing. In some
cases, this decision is a response to pressure from law school advisers who
presume that the trendiness of Islamic law is a golden ticket of some kind.
The interest in appearing in vogue with the latest scholarly trend is not
uncommon in the academy at large, but the peripheral place of Islamic law in
U.S. legal academies means that there are minimal checks on the fad. These
are high stakes: when law schools give pseudo-experts a platform, the ensuing
misinformation spreads beyond law schools and into the general public; and
when law schools compose questions about Islamic law, scholars from beyond
law schools rush to formulate appeasing answers. How and why Islamic law is
commodified in the U.S. legal academy deserves investigation.
It is not unusual for U.S. law professors to claim that their law school
needs an “Islamic law” scholar. But what is an “Islamic law” scholar? Often,
these law professors seek a colleague who can answer questions about Muslim
beliefs, practices, or societies. In other words, they want a colleague who can
explain that altogether ubiquitous “Other”—who can tell “Us” about “Them.”
In some cases, law schools seek a Muslim for identity politics reasons and
thereby make the offensive and egregious error of confusing “Islamic law
scholar” with “Muslim.” In other cases, law schools want an “Islamic law”
scholar in order to solicit funding from Muslim donors or will only consider
an Islamic legal specialist once they have obtained substantial funding for
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an endowed chair or program. Since law and law teaching are not the main
motivations, the interests of U.S. legal academics may be debatable on their
own terms. But rather than scrutinize those motivations, I want to explore
their outcomes because the nature of the U.S. legal academy’s interest in
“Islamic law” has detrimental consequences for scholarship. Without focused
expectations or standards for legal scholarship that touches upon Islamic
topics, U.S. legal academics inadvertently encourage this expanding field to
veer toward the amateurish (or worse) in responding to a rigid set of stale and
narrow questions.
Elsewhere, I have commented on how market forces shape what areas
of research receive attention in Islamic studies and how such influences
construct a problematic discursive framework.1 In that essay, I identified
government agencies, grant-awarding institutions, university administrators,
and the general public as interest groups who pose questions about Islam
prompted by current events; I argued that by concentrating on replying to
those ideological or political questions, scholars miss valuable opportunities
to introduce new and critical ways of thinking about Islamic studies. In line
with the broad dynamics I presented there, standard topics in Islamic legal
scholarship include violence (either war or “harsh” criminal punishments)
and the legal status of minorities and women.2 Scholarly research on these
precise topics generally disassociates Islamic doctrines from their historical
or legal contexts: Islamic legal sanctions of violence are not measured against
contemporaneous legal systems; the status of women and non-Muslims in
Islamic legal history is not linked to socio-political and economic realities
or connected to the situation of slaves, children, or laborers. Much Islamic
law scholarship is framed as an attempt to establish the (in)compatibility of
Islamic law and modernity, thereby channeling Bernard Lewis’s misleading
claims about a “clash” between Islam and modernity. Even more prevalent
in the U.S. legal academy is the contemporary “clash of civilizations” myth
(propounded by Samuel Huntington and others), which triggers scholarly
attention on the presumed or questioned incongruence of Islamic law and
democracy or Islamic law and human rights. Legal scholars spend much
intellectual energy attempting to justify the (in)compatibility between Islamic
law and neo-liberal norms, but far less energy describing and defending
those norms themselves. Of course, neither modernity nor neo-liberal norms
are easily definable—let alone accepted as a universal objective. This marketdriven attention provokes limited analyses of Islamic law by circling around
the same crude questions. Consequently, scholarship neglects to consider
many substantive areas of Islamic legal practices (court procedures, property
1.
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Of course, this selective interest in limited Islamic legal topics reflects both how “Us” sees
“Them” and what “Us” does not fully confront about itself: considering the wars, problems
of racial discrimination, and systemic gender inequality in the U.S., perhaps it is not
surprising that U.S. scholars would veer toward these topics.
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laws, rules of evidence, employment law, or environmental law) and of
Islamic legal theory (legal reasoning or legal hermeneutics). In other words,
the contemporary production of Islamic scholarship indicates that “cherry
picking” is widespread and that the cherries are picked to please the tastes of
an audience.
Undoubtedly, delivering scholarship for an audience with market power
is commonplace. Yet in the case of Islamic scholarship in the U.S. legal
academy, the situation is compounded and complicated by the absence of a
robust peer-review process and by an insufficient number of trained Islamic
law experts in law schools who can “regulate” scholarship in their field (since
many Islamic law specialists are housed in the humanities or social sciences)
or who can mentor younger scholars. Consequently, scholarship on “Islamic
law” produced in the U.S. for the consumption of law school audiences often
reiterates sound bites while reflecting wildly divergent levels of expertise. What
passes as “Islamic law” scholarship is at times journalistic, poorly researched,
and simply inaccurate. Moreover, even experienced Islamic law specialists are
pressured to succumb to the market forces of U.S. law schools and of political
discourse in their framing of research questions or translation of Islamic
legal ideas because of the lucrative career incentives. For instance, demands
for expert witnesses in cases that implicate Islamic legal issues (especially
terrorism cases) lead scholars to be politically complacent and generally
uncritical in an (impossible) attempt to exude neutrality. In addition, media
inquiries and speaking invitations demand that scholars answer the same stale
and narrow questions about Islamic law that are often framed in problematic
terms. Intending to communicate and to collaborate with colleagues, we
inadvertently neglect fine distinctions to answer the very questions about
Islamic law that we know are poorly formulated. Adding to this convoluted
situation, the field of Islamic legal studies itself is acutely fragmented, with
overlapping methodological and ideological factions that may not be obvious
to scholars outside the field. Unfortunately, because the average U.S. law
professor has little means to evaluate what is presented as “Islamic law,” this
tendency is likely to persist.
One obvious substantive example of these problems is the usage of the
term “sharīʿah” to lump together the legal traditions and systems of more
than 1,000 years of history, more than a billion people, and approximately
50 independent states.3 Resorting to this term in this way suggests that the
discourse of the U.S. legal academy is no more refined in its understanding
of Islamic legal history and Muslim legal cultures than the country’s political
mainstream. A serious challenge for scholars of Islamic law is how to educate
and to converse with diverse audiences without relying on the misleading
terminology that permeates contemporary discourse—“sharīʿah” offers an
indispensable illustration.
3.
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To remedy the analytical errors in Islamic legal studies, it is essential to
recognize the profound historical and substantive distinctions between
“Islamic law” and “law in Muslim societies.” The former term refers to juristic
interpretations of divine law (sharīʿah) and it is a translation of the term fiqh;
the latter term refers to law in Muslim societies, whether Muslims are the
majority or minority. Law in modern Muslim societies may be either state law
or the legal practices of non-state Muslim communities. I classify these two
fields of scholarship as “Islamic jurisprudence and legal history” and “Muslim
legalities.” The key distinction between these two overlapping objects of study
is that Islamic jurisprudence is generated by an interpretive process anchored
in canonical Islamic texts, whereas Muslim legalities are generated by an
interpretive process anchored in a state or other legal system that may or may
not be Islamic and with a population that may or may not be majority Muslim.
Some might argue that this classification is too historical or traditional
or any number of other such characterizations. I am certainly open to
modifying these categories and I recognize that sometimes the boundaries
are indistinguishable. Still, some form of classificatory clarity is desperately
needed, particularly since such distinctions are recognized in other legal
systems. To draw on an obvious comparison, we might correlate the historical
(and implicitly geographic) distinction to the difference between “Jewish law”
(what some might describe as rabbinic law or Talmudic hermeneutics) and
“law in contemporary Jewish communities.” A scholar of Jewish jurisprudence
is trained in analyzing the Talmud and other rabbinic legal texts in the
original languages (Aramaic and Hebrew) in order to understand both the
methodology and historical context of pre-modern Jewish law. (It should be
noted that, despite any overlap in linguistic or textual training with Talmud
studies, a scholar of the Bible or Midrash is not a Jewish law expert because
these are distinct fields of learning.) By comparison, a scholar of modern
Jewish law may not have extensive training in rabbinic legal texts but can
offer insights into legal issues in contemporary Jewish communities. While
these specializations necessitate different forms of training, some scholars do
cross over and research both the historical and contemporary legal texts and
contexts. This example from Jewish legal studies corresponds well to Islamic
legal studies.
Specialists in Islamic jurisprudence (both its methodology and history)
receive extensive training in Islamic legal genres from the late antique and
medieval periods, which is most often offered through a doctoral program in
Islamic studies (i.e. history, religious studies, or Near Eastern studies). Since
the majority of Islamic legal texts are only available in Arabic, knowledge of
medieval Arabic is a necessary (but by no means sufficient) prerequisite for
this area of study. (Notably, as in the case of biblical or midrashic studies,
Qurʾānic exegesis and ḥadīth studies are specialized fields distinguishable
from Islamic jurisprudential studies.) In comparison, specialists in modern
Muslim legalities receive training in a broad variety of fields and may hold
J.D.s or Ph.D.s; a wide range of language training likewise may be relevant,
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reflecting the diversity of contemporary Muslim societies. The point is that
just as a Talmud scholar is not the same as a modern Jewish law scholar, an
Islamic law scholar is not the same as a Muslim legalities scholar, in both
descriptive and prescriptive terms. This is not a value judgment: I am not
arguing that one kind of scholar is superior to another in any way. Likewise,
it is not my objective to create barriers for scholarly engagement. Instead,
I want to emphasize that meaningful scholarly conversations depend upon
specialized training and deep knowledge. Moreover, the distinction between
the study of Islamic legal history and the study of law in contemporary Muslim
societies needs to be unambiguous because of the ideological and political
consequences of the prevailing vagueness.
Recognizing these distinctions between Islamic legal systems and Muslim
legalities remains crucial to countering particularly detrimental features of
Orientalism and contemporary Islamophobia: the failure to acknowledge
historical change in Muslim societies; the failure to see a Muslim society as
shaped by any force other than “religion”; and the failure to recognize that
Islamic legal systems function much like many other legal systems. Indeed,
Islamophobia is itself one of the market forces that drives Islamic legal scholarship
toward a scripted set of questions and renders Islamic legal specialization as
inconsequential. The intellectual traps that I have delineated—about the (in)
compatibility of Islamic law and modernity or Islamic law and neo-liberal
norms—are themselves byproducts of contemporary Islamophobia. In spite
of the rhetoric, Islamic law cannot be offered as the sole causal explanation
for the contemporary or historical situation of any Muslim society, because no
legal system operates in isolation from socio-economic and political dynamics.
Dispelling the myriad historical and geographic distinctions of Islamic legal
systems—evident in clichéd references to “sharīʿah”—is an ideological strategy
that expresses itself in how the academy perceives scholarly specialization.
How market demands and ideology permeate academic specialization
can be clarified more explicitly. Muslim jurists developed an orthodox
jurisprudential methodology (uṣūl al-fiqh) in the medieval period and it
remains relevant to contemporary law in Muslim societies and to the daily
life of Muslims globally. But it is by no means the sole source in the legal
life of Muslims today. A scholar who has the extensive training necessary
for expertise in Islamic legal history and canonical Islamic texts is not, ipso
facto, an expert on law in contemporary Muslim societies, in the Middle East
or beyond. Likewise, a scholar who researches the legal system of a modern
nation-state with a Muslim majority population is not, ipso facto, an expert on
Islamic jurisprudence. There are myriad historical, geographic, political and
legal-textual differences between “Islamic jurisprudence” and “law in Muslim
societies.” What is missing from the landscape of the U.S. legal academy is
recognition that states with Muslim-majority populations have independent
legal systems: Indonesian law, Pakistani law, Turkish law, Mauritanian law,
Algerian law, Senegalese law, etc. Every Muslim-majority state has a distinct
national history—intertwined with either a colonial power (British or French) or
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a European sphere of influence—that shaped the basic structure (e.g. common
law or civil law) of its legal system. All of these diverse legal systems exist
within modern state structures that simply cannot be described as “Islamic
law.” To do so would be as incoherent as describing modern Italian law as
Catholic “canon law.”
These terminological distinctions are not mere academic hairsplitting. The
market’s commodified version of “Islamic law” has tangible consequences
for the production of knowledge. By way of example, U.S. legal academics
recently focused disproportionate attention on the reference to “Islamic law” as
a source of law in the drafting of the Egyptian and Tunisian constitutions. Yet
this issue is only one of many—perhaps more significant—legal questions being
debated in both countries, including restorative justice, legal accountability
for corruption, the legal status of constitution drafting, judicial reform, the
legal limits of political expression and dissent, legal protections for protestors
or political prisoners, and the law’s role in economic justice. In these debates,
the specific legal history of each state is vitally important and neither the
Egyptian nor Tunisian legal system can be described as purely “Islamic” or
even simply a derivative of Islamic jurisprudence. Indeed, both Egypt and
Tunisia have developed independent legal systems based on French civil law
that integrate Islamic legal traditions in distinct ways.
Instead of recognizing the variety, complexity, and diversity of law in
contemporary Muslim societies, U.S. legal academics fetishize Islamic law,
manifested in the erroneous use of the term “sharīʿah.” The existence of this
fetishizing phenomenon produces a centrifugal force, encouraging scholars
to neglect identifying or appreciating the distinctions enumerated above. For
example, Egyptian law experts might present their scholarship as relating to
Islamic law even if the subject of the research has absolutely no connection to
an Islamic sacred text, or the orthodox Islamic jurisprudential methodology,
or canonical Islamic legal texts. More importantly, scholars who choose to
concentrate on the “Islamic” dimensions of law in contemporary Muslim
societies neglect the vast areas of law unrelated to specifically Islamic
traditions. Consequently, modern nation-states, their legal histories, and their
unique legal systems are misinterpreted by inaccurate “Islamic law” rhetoric.
This rhetoric is also pernicious in its distortion of the relationship between
Islamic law and Muslim women. While the universal category of woman has
been soundly critiqued elsewhere by feminists and other scholars, Muslim
women continue to be perceived as a cohesive, homogenous group affected by
Islamic law in a uniform way, regardless of time or place. By way of example, in
the post-colonial era, emerging nation-states with Muslim majority populations
typically made family law the main repository of Islamic legal doctrines in
the state’s legal system. Much contemporary scholarship looks to family law
codes as signifiers for both Islamic law and the status of Muslim women in the
contemporary world. In addition to subsuming women’s status to the family,
this ignores both the breadth of contemporary Islamic legal practices (beyond
the confines of state legal systems) and the multiplicity of Muslim women’s

646

Journal of Legal Education

experiences (beyond the family). Because the market demands “reporting”
on women and on Islamic law—rather than penetrating analysis of the diverse
socio-economic realities of Muslim women or of how Islamic law is the site of
controversies over cultural authenticity—subtleties remain unrecognized.
Additionally, it is imperative to recognize when Islamic law is not the most
pertinent category for understanding the situations of Muslims—regardless of
gender. The topic of female circumcision is a poignant example of how market
dynamics mold scholarship. Although the practice is local (primarily in a few
regions of Africa) and cultural, it is regularly (and incorrectly) associated with
Islam. Moreover, the international community has likely paid disproportionate
attention to female circumcision when compared to, for example, the sex
slave trade, which devastates far more women in number and by geography.
That the cultural practice (female circumcision) receives proportionally more
attention than the economic reality (sex slavery) is reflected in other areas of
study. The market’s demands for stereotypes about the status of women under
Islamic law results in a skewed understanding of law in contemporary Muslim
communities.
Some readers may question the existence of evidence to support the claims
presented here; I could certainly cite to specific articles, scholars, or personal
experiences that demonstrate the weaknesses, errors, and even prejudices
previously mentioned. But that type of individualized attack is entirely
unproductive and risks distracting the reader from the broad dynamics I have
sought to elucidate. Teaching and research focused on Muslim legalities,
Islamic jurisprudence, and Islamic legal history can make (and already have
made) valuable contributions to the U.S. legal academy. But law schools
should reassess the value of the “Islamic law” commodity being traded in legal
academia. There are some easy steps law professors can take to estimate the
worth, rather than marketability, of legal scholarship related to the Muslim
world. In addition to seeking anonymous external reviews from appropriate
Islamic law or Muslim legalities experts, law school faculties should closely
scrutinize footnotes for references to primary sources (usually not translations),
question the details of any evidentiary claim, and support and recognize peerreview publications in specialized journals. With attention to how “Islamic
law” is commodified both in public and academic discourses, I hope U.S. law
faculties will feel encouraged to discuss the place of Islamic legal studies in the
academy. Perhaps these conversations can develop into new kinds of market
demands that will animate more rigorous scholarship and more professional
judgment in the production of that scholarship. After all, innovation develops
from critical assessment, not inertia.

